
"Don't Know, Don't Shoot" Argument

The Don’t Know, Don’t Shoot Argument can also be called the “Life Bias” argument as it references a humanitarian bias in favor of protecting life. It could also be called the “Burden of Proof” Argument as it proposes that pro-choicers shoulder the heavier burden of proof.
In short, this idea asserts that it is the responsibility of whoever is advocating for killing human beings to show that that act of killing is somehow justified since killing human beings is a morally and heavy matter that should not be wielded lightly or with insufficient evidence to justify the act.
The burden of proof, in this case, constitutes “reasonable certainty.” I.e., demonstrate one’s case beyond a reasonable doubt, otherwise we should not grant that abortion is justified.
This burden of proof stems, in part, from the humanitarian life-bias where there is a normal ethical duty to treat human life, even contentious forms of it, with non-malfeasance (i.e., “do no harm”). Killing is, by definition, harmful to the life of the child.
The moral “default” is protection, not killing; unless we know otherwise, we should try to save, or at least, not intentionally kill innocent humans. Yet abortion does that. Therefore, abortion isn’t justified. We might call this default aversion to killing human life as the “life bias.”
This idea is analogous to the legal standard of, “innocent until proven guilty.” The child-in-utero is not considered to be worthy of a death sentence unless the pro-choice advocate can show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this child is either deserving of a death sentence (should the mother so desire) or it is otherwise unworthy of protection against the killing.
Premise 1: Life Bias
We should seek to protect human life as the moral default so long as there is reasonable doubt about that kind of killing/harm.
Premise 2: Reasonable Doubt
Elective abortion is riddled with reasonable doubt.
Conclusion: Abortion Ban
Therefore, we should reject elective abortion.
Simply put, the argument proposes a humanitarian life-bias, then states that abortion fails to achieve reasonable certainty in light of that life-bias, so the conclusion is that elective abortion is wrong.
Huntsman Analogy:
This argument is nicknamed the “Don’t Know, Don’t Shoot” argument because of the old story/legend of the huntsman: if you don’t know [what’s in the bush], don’t shoot. It might be a deer (and killing is ethical at least for food or self-defense). Or it might be your hunting partner (who shouldn’t be killed). By analogy, if we don’t know with reasonable certainty if abortion is justified, or we aren’t exactly sure what/who is killed in an abortion, then that abortion isn’t justified.
Elective Abortion:
The argument could be framed around “abortion” generally, but that would include life-saving therapeutic abortions. Since the mother’s life is no less important than the child’s life, abortion could be justified on the grounds of self-defense. Of course, the manner of abortion would still need to be ethical (ex., minimal injury, trying to save the child’s life too, applying neonate hospice, etc.). nevertheless, it is granted for the sake of argument that therapeutic abortions aren’t in view here, rather it’s about elective abortions, aka., abortion-on-demand or “convenience abortions.”
Strengths
Humanitarianism:
The life-bias is a humanitarian basic, intuitive and compelling, as it treats human life as something to be protected, all else being equal.
Medical ethics:
The life-bias aligns well with the normal and historic sense of medical ethics, namely, the two-fold principles of: (1) Do no harm and (2) Do good. As long as society has a humanitarian aim, we cannot safely assume that half of the human beings involved in an abortion are invisible to medical ethics. As such, they should be treated, at least, with the most basic principles of medical ethics – do no harm to the child, and do good as far as the child is concerned. Minimally, that would include, don’t kill them unless the reason for doing so is beyond a reasonable doubt.
Doesn’t require personhood:
One can remain agnostic on fetal personhood here, and instead let the known scientific evidence do the work. Biologically speaking, there’s no real debate about whether new human beings begin at conception. As such, we’re dealing with a genetically distinct, new human being, from the moment of conception onward. Regardless of the personhood debate, every abortion is leveraged against a biological human being. The burden, therefore, is on the abortion-advocate to show that those human beings aren’t human enough to qualify for human rights. Again, the debate over personhood can be suspended while the abortion debate, here, focuses on the different wrong wrapped into abortion that can disqualify it on humanitarian grounds.
Lower burden of proof:
Instead of trying it prove fetal personhood, or some other ‘wrongs’ committed in abortion, the Don’t Know, Don’t Shoot argument requires only reasonable doubt. That is low bar. Yet it’s well-placed since abortion is known to kill living human beings, and as long as there’s reasonable doubt about whether that act of killing is justified, the humanitarian bias should be to refrain from that act of killing. Why raise the bar, requiring a higher burden of proof for pro-lifers, when reasonable doubt is normally enough to derail a capital punishment conviction (where the defendant might in fact be guilty). Reasonable doubt should be entirely sufficient grounds for abstaining from killing someone, especially if we know he or she is a legally and morally innocent human being.
Abortion-Focus:
While the personhood argument can detour into a semantic debate about philosophical and legal definitions of “personhood” or preoccupy with scientific minutia, distinguishing haploid and diploid genetics, developmental stages, and so forth, the Don’t Know, Don’t Shoot arguments keeps abortion at the center stage. This framing allows for a vast and scouring investigation into the many areas of reasonable doubt that can be leveled against abortion choice culture, abortion ideology, abortion-choice policy, and the abortion industry itself. This abortion-focus is a tactical advantage since the ugly reality of abortion favors the pro-life position, whereas a sterile semantic dispute can favor the pro-choicer by distracting people away from the bloody, deadly, and repulsive images of abortion practice.
Fewer Concessions:
It makes fewer concessions compared to the personhood argument, where it’s often conceded that abortion is wrong only if the fetus is a person. The Don’t Know Don’t Shoot Argument, instead, allows for a wide range of wrongs besides just child-murder, and any number of these could discredit abortion. Reasonable doubt can lurk in racial disparities (higher abortion rates among black and minority populations), gender disparities (sex-selective abortion), ability-based discrimination (eugenic abortion), death profiteering, theft (if one’s life is their own property, it’s wrong to take it), child abuse, animal abuse, desecration, lack of due process (issuing the equivalent of a capital punishment without a trial), dehumanization, selfishness, anti-family, anti-motherhood, harmful, traumatizing, and more.
Weaknesses
What about Non-Humanitarians?:
The Don’t Know, Don’t Shoot Argument works well within a humanitarian framework, namely, the belief that all human beings are created equal, endowed by their creator [be it nature, God, or both] with the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In that humanitarian framework, the Life-Bias is a moral default, and for fear of wrongly killing an innocent human being, we should erect a high burden of proof to protect against that fate. But what if someone rejects humanitarianism? People can deliberately or unwittingly reject humanitarianism and instead favor a kind of libertinism (where liberty is prized above the right of life), or a religious hyper-fundamentalism (where the lives of believers are prized above the non-believers), or some brand of anarchism and dog-eat-dog darwinism (where “only the strong survive natures bloody tooth and claw”). Ideally, society could align on some robust humanitarianism, but it would be naïve to think that everyone is generally willing to adhere to humanitarian ethics and culture, especially if it were to mean sacrifice or restraint on their part.
Reasonable Doubt Can still be Doubted:
The concept of “reasonable doubt” has a legal definition of 95%+ certainty, and/or only unreasonable or absurd doubts remain. Unfortunately, there’s a long history in philosophy of scrutinizing any effort at reasonable certainty to where whole schools of thought have arisen which deny any certainty or knowledge. While the category of “beyond a reasonable doubt” can be a valuable legal category, and an vital intersection between policy debate and judicial standards, when it comes to popular level discourse and public debate, many people either don’t know or don’t allow for such a category. In their view, everything is open to reasonable doubt.
Why think that abortion-choice advocates have a particularly high burden of proof?

Killing innocent, healthy, non-threatening children-in-utero contradicts humanitarianism. It’s not intuitive, nor is it, at face value, exempt from the normal “life bias” of humanitarian ethics or from medical ethics (i.e., it doesn’t qualify as non-malfeasance, “do no harm”).
A. It’s not clearly beneficial for all parties
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Beneficence (“do good”) is a basic principle in medical ethics.
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And beyond medicine, it is an ethical default, a cultural universal.
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It’s a facet of the golden rule, which is (nearly) a cultural universal.
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Yet abortion does not satisfy this ethical default in regards to the child-in-utero.
B. It fails the medical ethics principle of “First Do No harm” (the principle of non-malfeasance)
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Non-malfeasance (don’t harm others) is basic to medical ethics.
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It’s an ethical default in other cultures and other fields of ethics (business ethics, philosophical ethics, biblical ethics, religious ethics, etc.).
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Yet abortion fails to satisfy this ethical default in regards to the child-in-utero.
C. Nor does the history or spread of abortion-choice policy suggest abortion is intuitive or “obviously” good and thereby excused as a humanitarian norm, or even as a “necessary evil” conventionally accepted across most societies.
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Ex., the Hippocratic Oath (original versus) prohibits abortion.
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U.S. courts didn’t legalize it till 1973; English courts in 1967. Other countries show the same liberal shift in the same, mid-to-late 20th century period: China (1957); Cuba (1965) Singapore (1970); India (1971); Zambia (1972); Tunisia (1973); Vietnam (1975); Turkey (1983); Taiwan (1985); and others. See: Susan A. Cohen, “Facts and Consequences: Legality, Incidence, and Safety of Abortion Worldwide,” Guttmacher Policy Review 12, no. 4 (Fall 2009), accessed 12 October 2015 at: https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/12/4/gpr120402.html
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Abortion may have been practiced in different ways for most of human history, and law codes varied in precision regarding what practices are legally protected. Yet only recently has abortion become an explicit legally-defended social norm. The overwhelming majority view across human history has been to generally ban abortion for the sake of protecting women and children, and this anti-abortion norm applied to the U.S. into the 1950’s when medical technology had finally advanced enough to reassure a good chance of safety for the mother.
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Nor can one say that recent legalization merely reflects improved technology, thus safer standards for women. Those are factors but are not the normal stated reasons for the ban. The typically reason stated for bans on abortion regarded its threat to the child, and/or its implications for human rights/human dignity/sanctity of life, or even religious protections for children.
It’s Life or Death.
A. Mortally threatening acts should be broached carefully, if at all.
B. Killing is ultimate and irreversible harm, so it’s not to be treated lightly.
Legal and ethical precedents establish this level of proof, including Capital Crime trials.
a. Killing humans is treated with more legal/ethical weight than, say, killing a pet or potted plant.
b. Before administering a death sentence, the U.S. judicial system has many checks and balances (different levels of appeals, trial, by a jury, of peers, federal and state reprieves, etc.). Each of these testifies that our legal system is designed to protect human life from wrongful killing.
c. Altogether, this constitutes the highest required level of proof in U.S. law—“beyond a reasonable doubt” (also, explained as 95%+ certainty; where only absurd and unreasonable doubts remain).
Potential crime against humanity.
a. Crimes against humanity are as serious as crimes can get, yet they can be legal in federal/national/state law. This crime can be legal by federal standards yet violate intrinsic human rights.
b. Meanwhile, abortion kills a member of the order and species homo sapiens hence it is a human being. And the scope and distribution of abortion, if it were unethical, would make it unrivaled in scale comparable to many war crimes and genocides put together. As such, abortion satisfies minimal criteria to potentially be a crime against humanity.
Legal consistency.
a. Under different circumstances—which pose no substantial difference to the nature of the child itself—the same act would be treated as murder (the Unborn Victims of Violence Act 2004).
b. Presumably, our legal code should be internally consistent and should align with ethical ideals insofar as those are within reach and would not incur greater harm.
Human Dignity.
Human dignity/sanctity/rights are a hard fought set of ideas in world history; intuitively powerful yet tough to prove. Dehumanization (like slavery) sprouts where ever expediency trumps decency.
