When someone chooses to have sex, even while taking steps to avoid pregnancy, they are still choosing an action with a well-known biological outcome: pregnancy is a foreseeable effect of that choice. This is different from unrelated surprises that might follow a leisure activity, because sex is uniquely ordered toward reproduction, even when conception is not intended. Knowing an action carries a chance of creating a dependent human being means that the possibility of that outcome is built into the consent itself.
A simple illustration makes the point clearer. Imagine a machine that reliably produces pleasure when a button is pressed, but everyone knows that, on occasion, a newborn child will appear as a result. Choosing a button with a lower probability does not eliminate the risk; it only reduces it. If a newborn appears, it would be clearly wrong to abandon the child to die, because the person knowingly chose the action that could bring an inherently needy child into existence.
That choice generates at least a minimal obligation. Creating a dependent child does not require agreeing to every possible burden forever, but it does require providing basic care—such as food and shelter—until responsibility can be transferred to someone else. The obligation flows not from intention, but from causation and foreseeability.
By the same reasoning, consenting to sex includes consenting to the possibility of pregnancy and the resulting duty to meet a dependent child’s basic needs. Ending that dependency through abandonment or lethal action is not justified simply because the dependency was unwanted; it arose from a voluntary act whose consequences were known in advance.
Key Takeaways
Foreseeable consequences matter: choosing sex includes accepting the known possibility of pregnancy, even when precautions are taken.
Creating a dependent human being generates moral obligations, regardless of whether that dependency was intended.
Reduced risk is not the same as no responsibility; knowingly taking a chance still grounds duty if the outcome occurs.
Minimal obligations—such as preserving life and providing basic care—are owed until care can be transferred, not nullified by lack of desire.